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Although we talk a lot about “school choice” in policy circles – and I’m as guilty as anyone – in fact 
it is nothing but a mechanism. Like most mechanisms, the value of school choice depends on how 
it is guided by policy-makers and employed by those who choose.  Some years ago, I was asked at an 
in-service day for World Bank staff, “Is school choice a good thing or a bad thing?” and had the wit 
to reply simply, “Yes!” 
 
Most school choices in the United States are neither novel nor guided by public policy. Is there any 
residential realtor who does not keep information about schools available for families choosing 
where to rent or buy? Eighteen decades ago Horace Mann complained, in his Common School Journal, 
about wealthy parents who preferred private academies. And when it comes to choice of schools 
outside of the areas where families live, ample evidence shows that it is upwardly mobile, working-
class families who are most eager for such opportunities. 
 
School choices that have not been guided by wise public policy but made simply on the basis of test 
scores, as with the “league tables” that play a large role in school choice in England, or of the 
desirable social characteristics (including race) of the pupils already attending the school, offer a 
glimpse of human nature at work not a strategy for improving the education of a nation. 
 
Although such a situation may (or may not) have some effect on instructional outcomes through 
competition, it will do less than nothing for the deeper challenge of education, the formation of 
decent human beings and good citizens. This is what Mary Ann Glendon calls “a basic problem of 
politics – how to foster in the nation’s citizens the skills and virtues that are essential to the 
maintenance of our democratic regime” (Glendon 1995, 2). As we will see, this requires challenging 
the long-dominant “myth of the common school” as the unique nursery of citizens. 
 
Rationales for Parental Choice 
Those who promote school-choice by policy rather than by residence suggest several rationales in 
support. One persuasive rationale is opening up school choice leads to a better match of children 
and the schools best suited to meet their needs. Another is that it permits schools to be focused and 
distinctive, and thus more effective. A third is that competition rewards effective schools and forces 
ineffective ones to close. 





fundamental human right. After all, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) states, “Parents 
have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children” (article 26, 
3). According to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), 
…the States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to have respect for the liberty 
of parents . . . to choose for their children schools, other than those established by 
public authorities, which conform to such minimum educational standards as may 
be laid down or approved by the State and to ensure the religious and moral 
education of their children in conformity with their own convictions (article 13,3). 
 
Closer to home, in 1925 the Supreme Court, in Pierce v. Society of Sisters (268 U.S. 510), struck 
down an Oregon law requiring all children to attend public schools until completion of the eighth 
grade, finding that this unjustly threatened the rights of private corporations (schools) to carry out 
their business and that it interfered with the right of parents to direct the education of their 
children. The Court pointed out that: 
 
the fundamental theory of liberty upon which all governments in this Union repose 
excludes any general power of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to 
accept instruction from public teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of 
the state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right, coupled with 
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations. 
 
Legal Scholar John Coons made this case eloquently: 
 
[T]he right to form families and to determine the scope of their children's practical 
liberty is for most men and women the primary occasion for choice and 
responsibility. One does not have to be rich or well placed to experience the family. 
The opportunity over a span of fifteen or twenty years to attempt the transmission 
of one's deepest values to a beloved child provides a unique arena for the creative 
impulse. Here is the communication of ideas in its most elemental mode. Parental 
expression, for all its invisibility to the media, is an activity with profound First 
Amendment implications (Coons 1985, 511). 
 
However, persuasive as these rationales may be individually and taken together, there is little 
evidence in this or in other countries that such rationales in themselves have led to the adoption of 
public policies promoting parental choice. Such arguments have not been able to overcome the 
entrenched resistance of the status quo of bureaucratically governed and monopolistic schooling, 
which draws upon a powerful combination of ideological convictions and material interests. Rather, 
we must look elsewhere to find the origins of school choice, where it has come to be a significant 
policy framework. 
 
By contrast with the United States, every country in Western Europe (Italy is a partial exception) 
provides public funding for schools that are not operated by any level of government, including, 
notably, schools with a religious character. As I have shown elsewhere, these arrangements did not 




a peaceful resolution decades of bitter political and cultural struggle (Glenn 2011). In the 
Netherlands, where such arrangements enable some seventy percent of pupils to attend non-
government schools, this is referred to as the “Pacification” of 1917. Most democracies moved to 




One of the puzzles in comparative educational policy is why the United States has lagged so far 
behind other Western democracies, including our neighbor Canada, in promoting educational 
freedom. Why is it only in the last few years that American governments at different levels have 
begun to provide public support for alternative education based on our religious diversity? 
 
Surely a large part of the answer is that, in contrast with other countries, our provision of schools 
has been in large part through local initiatives, with the states playing only a modest role and the 
federal government, none at all (apart from data collection and some vocational education 
initiatives) until recent decades. Conflict over the desire of many immigrant parents for Catholic 
schools was largely an urban phenomenon that did not touch the hundred thousand local school 
districts, and it occurred at a time when the national Republican Party, giving up on Reconstruction, 
found in anti-Catholicism a useful political issue (Glenn 2012). 
 
Under these circumstances, the great majority of public schools were thoroughly acceptable to their 
local communities, sharing the prevailing values of those communities, including a generalized 
Protestantism that caused no offense to majoritarian sensibilities.  
 
When public policies supporting parental choice of schools emerged in the United States, then, it 
was not in response to religious conflict, as in Europe, but neither was it because policy-makers were 
persuaded by the arguments for the educational benefits of school-choice policies. The development 
of magnet schools, “controlled-choice” assignments, and inter-district transfer programs were a 
politically acceptable way to meet race desegregation obligations without resorting to the mandatory 
assignments known polemically as “forced busing.” The public school’s vested interests were willing 
to accept this enhancement of the role of parents only because the alternative of social conflict 
became even more disruptive. 
 
In the process, many of us came to see that urban schools that had been allowed to become 
distinctive in order to attract parents also became, in the process, more educationally effective 
because more focused. This was never an argument we could use, however, to convince local officials 
to implement magnet schools or “controlled choice” assignments, or to persuade teacher unions to 
accept them. 
 
Structural Pluralism and Its Defense 
Schools are seldom a source of controversy in other Western democracies. Even with extensive 
secularization, parents in these countries continue to demand diverse approaches and worldview 
perspectives within the publicly supported educational system, and an even-handed government 




associations. This is what we are learning to call “structural pluralism” in policy arrangements, and 
“sector agnosticism” on the part of government (Garnett 2017). 
 
Pluralism is not the same thing as “diversity,” which is simply the unavoidable recognition that 
human beings vary in many different ways, significant and insignificant. Rather, pluralism implies 
the recognition that certain forms of difference constitute the basis for association within the larger 
social order and deserve some form of public accommodation because of their deep significance for 
those identifying with such associations. Religion, ethnicity, and (related to the latter) home 
language are perhaps the leading factors in pluralism, and there are few nations that have not 
wrestled with how to accommodate such pluralism while maintaining a sense of common identity 
and purpose. Schooling is only one of many sectors – though the most significant – in which such 
pluralism has been accommodated in the policies of the Netherlands and other countries. In the 
United States, by contrast, while such pluralism flourishes in civil society, it receives scant 
recognition or support in public policies. 
 
Structural pluralism consists of legal and policy arrangements that provide space for coherent 
understandings of the human good to take institutional form, to flourish, to adapt to new 
circumstances, and to be transmitted to new generations and (in some cases) to adults who choose 
to associate themselves with the group. For centuries, of course, and still to a considerable extent, 
this occurs through civil society’s institutions – families, religious and other voluntary associations, 
cooperative arrangements around shared goals – quite apart from any governmental guidance or 
support. In recent decades, however, the extent and variety of government interventions have made 
it difficult for these institutions to simply carry on without government recognition or support. 
 
Under these conditions, structural pluralism cannot exist unless institutions and services that 
operate in parallel to those provided by government are provided with comparable public support. 
This has been the case in the United States with respect to hospitals, youth and elder services, higher 
education, and a whole range of other functions, but not with respect to K-12 schooling. The 
fundamental reason for the different treatment of schooling is the persistent “myth of the common 
school,” the belief, contrary to all evidence, that only the public school forms loyal citizens (Glenn 
2000). 
 
Is the Public School Neutral? 
But is it not possible that the United States has reached a point of fundamental conflict over cultural 
and religious issues, often focused on schooling, and that the pluralistic solution that serves other 
Western democracies well is now plausible? Perhaps it is time that schools be withdrawn from our 
cultural battlefields, with the sort of “pacification” that has served the Dutch and other democratic 
peoples. 
 
Two relatively recent developments have converged in the United States to create conflicts over 
schooling that led to structural pluralism in education policies in other nations. 
 
One is the weakening of the local character of public schools for a variety of reasons, including 




the growing intrusion of state and federal governments in what is taught in public schools. Another 
is the growing alienation of a significant proportion of the population, on mingled cultural and 
religious grounds, from the values promoted by governing elites through media and the courts 
(Williams 2017). Since the Second World War, public schools have remained a focal point of such 
alienation; one need only mention the school prayer and Bible reading court rulings, controversies 
over sex education and other curricular impositions, and recent disagreements over use of 
bathrooms and locker rooms by transgender individuals. The public schools often serve as the 
transmission line through which such angry disputes reach into every community. In contrast with 
other Western democracies, the American public schools have been continuously roiled by 
controversy, often of an especially bitter quality. This has undoubtedly contributed to the ugly 
national mood so evident today. 
 
In theory, of course, the possibility of conflict over values in schooling could be eliminated by making 
schools value-free, and something of this sort has been attempted in recent years in the United 
States. But of course there is no such thing as value-free schooling; in daily life and special assemblies, 
in unspoken assumptions, in what is rewarded and what is sanctioned, what is displayed and what 
is not, in how teachers talk about the students among themselves, every school has a culture that 
communicates itself irresistibly to students (Wynne & Ryan 1986). Some public schools also have a 
deliberately-chosen ethos, often the work of a charismatic leader over many years, that is shared by 
the teachers and shapes the culture of the school in all of its particulars. 
 
The Civic Republican project dear to Horace Mann and his many allies in the United States and 
elsewhere in the nineteenth century sought to shape loyal citizens through schooling under the 
supervision of, if not direct management by, government officials.  At the heart of the education 
provided by public schools was what Robert Bellah called a “civil religion,” others “the democratic 
creed,” though it has gone by many other names as well. In the United States, it was tinctured with 
a generic Protestantism, the credibility of which has eroded drastically since the 1960s. 
 
Although we should not generalize about many thousands of public schools, it is fair to say that the 
prevailing orthodoxy among those who write about the goals of schooling, those who train teachers, 
and those who shape the “discourse” about teaching, is that schools should above all promote critical 
thinking, autonomy, and liberation from inherited beliefs and values, in a process of self-creation 
and authenticity. Thus, “educational theory as taught in colleges of education, championed by 
superintendents, and accepted by teachers, has witnessed profound shifts in the dominant 
understanding of the child and the telos of education. The child is no longer seen as existing within 
larger relationships that inspire, demand, and constrain, but rather as an autonomous entity who 
bears the burden of self-creation” (Berner & Hunter 2014, 202). 
 
Today’s public school students are still exposed to many of the facts and even documents that were 
the staple of what has been called the Civic Republican education program, but now these are used 
by the progressive curriculum as opportunities to develop critical judgment, to speculate about 
motivation, and to uncover hypocrisy. There is nothing wrong with critical judgment, of course, but 
the danger is that students become cynical about the accumulated wisdom of their society and their 





The shallowness of such an educational goal has never been expressed better than by the late 
Christopher Lasch, who wrote that, in the contemporary liberal view, “How should I live?. . . 
becomes a matter of taste, of idiosyncratic personal preference.” But this is not adequate, Lasch 
insists. “The question of how one ought to live requires us to speak of impersonal virtues like 
fortitude, workmanship, moral courage, honesty, and respect for adversaries.” Democracy, Lasch 
insists, “requires a more invigorating ethic than tolerance. Tolerance is a fine thing, but it is only 
the beginning of democracy, not its destination. In our time democracy is more seriously threatened 
by indifference than by intolerance or superstition” (Lasch 1995, 87, 89). 
 
Ironically enough, given the liberal elite’s scorn for American consumer culture, this emphasis on 
autonomy is thoroughly consistent with and encourages a lifestyle based on consumerism with no 
fixed goals. In what philosopher Charles Taylor has called the Age of Authenticity, the only 
obligation of the fulfilled human life is “bare choice as a prime value, irrespective of what it is a 
choice between, or in what domain.” The corollary of this defining value is the obligation to respect 
the choices that others make; thus the only “sin which is not tolerated is intolerance” (Taylor 2007, 
478, 484). 
 
The Paradox of Autonomy 
The most striking aspect of the emphasis, by education theorists, on autonomy and unconstrained 
choice is its intolerance: it is not itself represented as a choice. In the spirit of Rousseau’s Contrat 
Social, every child will be forced to be free, will be under a compulsion to become autonomous. Thus 
Meira Levinson asserts unapologetically that “[f]or the state to foster children’s development of 
autonomy requires coercion – i.e., it requires measures that prima facie violate the principles of 
freedom and choice. . . .The coercive nature of state promotion of the development of autonomy 
also means that children do not have the luxury of ‘opting out’ of public autonomy-advancing 
opportunities in the same way that adults do.” Nor should this educational objective of autonomy 
itself be subject to public debate, since, she insists, it is a fundamental premise of the liberal state 
which is not open to question  (Levinson 1999, 38-9, 139). 
 
Political scientist William Galston stresses the partisan nature of such “Comprehensive Liberalism” 
and the threat that its ascendancy poses to traditional communities, since “liberalism is not equally 
hospitable to all ways of life or to all subcommunities. Ways of life that require self-restraint, 
hierarchy, or cultural integrity are likely to find themselves on the defensive, threatened with the 
loss of both cohesion and authority.” As a result, Galston points out, “the more one examines 
putatively neutral liberal principles and public discourse, the more impressed one is likely to become 
by their decidedly nonneutral impact on different parts of diverse societies. Liberalism is not and 
cannot be the universal response, equally acceptable to all, to the challenge of social diversity. It is 
ultimately a partisan stance” (Galston 1991, 293, 297). No wonder that religious organizations and 
individuals who take their beliefs seriously sometimes feel under attack in this allegedly tolerant 
society. 
 
The focus on giving the greatest possible scope to assertions of individual preferences across a wide 




authenticity, have crowded out the concerns that animated previous generations of liberals as well 
as reformers like Horace Mann and his allies. “Not long ago liberals thought of themselves as 
advancing a governing philosophy based on strong principles and firm convictions. Today liberalism 
can’t appeal to strong, robust moral truths, at least not overtly, for they threaten the dictatorship of 
relativism and therefore compromise the goal of lifestyle liberation” (Reno 2012, 6). Not only are 
contemporary liberals reluctant to invoke norms and goals that were taken for granted by their 
predecessors, but they often support policies that undermine institutions of civil society that have 
traditionally nurtured such norms and striven to achieve such goals. Peter Berkowitz warns that 
 
…the operation and maintenance of liberal democracy – that form of democracy in 
which the will of the people is grounded in and limited by individual rights – depend 
upon the exercise or moral and intellectual virtues that, according to liberalism’s own 
tenets, fall outside its strict supervision, and that it not only does not always 
effectively summon but may even discourage or undermine (Berkowitz 1999, 6). 
 
The invitation, experienced by many children and youth in America’s public schools, to put together 
an identity and a code of behavior that are idiosyncratic, radically personal, cobbled together from 
randomly-chosen elements attractive for a variety of reasons, is likely to produce very unstable results. 
Galston points out that, contrary to all the warnings by comprehensive liberals about the 
indoctrination of children by families and religious institutions, and the insistence that public 
schools have an obligation to liberate them from this oppression, in fact 
 
 [t]he greatest threat to children in modern liberal societies is not that they will believe 
in something too deeply, but that they will believe in nothing very deeply at all. . . . 
Rational deliberation among ways of life is far more meaningful if (and I am tempted 
to say only if) the stakes are meaningful, that is, if the deliberator has strong 
convictions against which competing claims can be weighed. The role of parents in 
fostering such convictions should be welcomed, not feared (Galston 1991, 255). 
 
David Steiner offers the same warning is slightly different terms: “It is a fine line, indeed, between 
teaching mutual respect and inculcating universal apathy, and a large constituency argues that the 
schools have crossed it” (Steiner 1994, 8). 
 
Those who support structural pluralism in schooling do not challenge the right of teachers to seek 
to promote individual autonomy and self-definition at the expense of group loyalties and inherited 
convictions about the nature of a flourishing life, or of parents who desire such an education for 
their children to choose schools that claim to provide it. What they challenge is the use of that claim 
to prevent other schools from providing, and parents from choosing, a distinctly different education. 
 
But if public policy is to enforce the educational prescription that every child should be educated 
for autonomy for his or her own sake as well as for that of society and the liberal state, then it is 
evident that non-public schools would have to be required to conform their goals and practices to 
those of public schools. “As a result,” Levinson insists, “schools should not attempt to advance or to 




schools must be structured as autonomy-promoting communities which are ‘detached’ from local 
and parental control.” The inevitable result would be that “there would in practice be little if 
anything to distinguish private schools from state schools – which is exactly the way it should be. 
”Faith-based schools, in particular, would have no place in such a scheme, since religion provides a 
“socially divisive conception of the good” and thus “religious schools would violate the liberal 
educative aims of commonality, autonomy, and citizenship” (Levinson 1999, 144-5, 158). 
 
There would thus be no room for the autonomy and distinctiveness of schools. Since only one model 
of human flourishing could be promoted in schools, that of individual autonomy, it would be 
necessary for the state to insist that every school, whether operated by local government or by private 
association, make that its defining mission. 
 
Amy Gutmann, in what is intended as a gesture toward pluralism, proposes that a “better alternative 
to prohibiting private schools would be to devise a system of primary schooling that accommodates 
private religious schools on the condition that they, like public schools, teach the common set of 
democratic values” (Gutmann 1987, 117), through the discussion of every issue without appeal to 
religious or other authority. With equal “generosity,” James Dwyer, in detailing the deplorable effects 
of religious schools, concedes that they may be permitted as an alternative, but only if they conform 
themselves to public schools through abandoning such “harmful practices” as “compelling religious 
expression and practice, teaching secular subjects from a religious perspective . . . and making 
children’s sense of security and self-worth depend on being ‘saved’ or meeting unreasonable, divinely 
ordained standards of conduct” (Dwyer 1998, 159). 
 
Here we come upon an apparent paradox: if the goal of schooling is to nurture individual autonomy 
in this self-referential form, then school autonomy is not important. What the latter seeks to serve is 
group identities, shared values, communities that distinguish themselves by loyalty to one another 
and, in many cases, to a tradition and a set of religious beliefs which they consider of fundamental 
importance. As Adam Seligman reminds us, “This idea of moral autonomy . . . is contested by 
billions of church, mosque, temple, and synagogue goers the world over. For these religiously 
committed individuals, people are not morally autonomous, but, rather, live under heteronomous-
enacted and revealed laws. The secular, liberal claims for moral autonomy are not then as neutral as 
they present themselves to be” (Seligman 2014, 14). Of course, this pushes against not only 
religiously but also philosophically and pedagogically distinctive schools that seek to introduce 
children to a distinctive cultural tradition and understanding of the good life. 
 
Comprehensive liberalism has no patience with what it represents as constraints on individual 
flourishing. Schools that set out to liberate their students from “white privilege,” from 
“heteronormativity,” and from religious and other traditions, and to promote “global consciousness” 
in place of a mis-guided nationalism, are certain to offend some proportion of the families who have 
little choice but to entrust their children to what they consider a hostile environment. This is a 
formula for the sort of deep-rooted cultural conflict that other Western democracies, often after 






Of course, structural pluralism in education would leave ample room for schools seeking to promote 
individual autonomy for the children of families who choose that educational goal, but only as one 
among a variety of options. It would remove the major source of conflict plaguing American public 
schools, and one of the contributing causes of America’s sadly-divided public today. 
 
Educational pluralism offers a way out of these conflicts -- over what education is for, who 
the child is, and what role teachers and schools should play -- since it refuses to privilege one 
view over another. Instead of progressive and traditionalist educators competing for 
ideological dominance, they can populate and influence schools that want their particular 
approach. Instead of pretending to be ideologically neutral, public schooling could offer 
parents a variety of choices that reflect their beliefs and their children’s pedagogical needs. 
In short, educational pluralism opens up this conversation in a way that purported neutrality 
and uniformity cannot. Educational pluralism is not only more honest about the formational 
nature of education and the deep differences between pedagogical approaches, but the 
political philosophy that supports it and the institutions it generates are more democratic 
than our present system (Berner 2012, 41). 
 
 
Making Structural Pluralism Work in Practice 
A Belgian colleague (an authority on human rights) and I published, in 2012, the third edition of 
our four-volume reference work on how 65 different national education systems balance competing 
demands: the right of parents to direct the education of their children through choice, the right of 
educators to work together to create and maintain distinctive schools reflecting their convictions 
about how best to educate, and the responsibility of society to ensure that every child is adequately 
instructed in the knowledge and skills required for a successful life in that particular society (Glenn 
& De Groof 2012). 
 
Two generalizations may be drawn from this survey relevant to the question of how to implement 
structural pluralism in education. One is that every country seeks to monitor the results and, to a 
substantial degree, the content of instruction in skills and knowledge which each school provides. In 
some cases, there is a national syllabus of required content that private as well as public schools are 
required to follow. In others, this is not imposed upon private schools, but they tend to follow it to 
ensure successful results on external examinations. 
 
Instruction in skills and knowledge is, of course, an essential part of schooling, and whether it is 
done well or badly can have life-long consequences. It is not, however, the only mission of good 
schools. They also educate, shape the character, values, life goals, and loyalties of their students. Good 
schools do so, but many schools do not, including some that produce acceptable results from 
instruction. 
 
The good school is, by its essential nature, a moral community within which adults accept and share 
responsibility for guiding children or youth toward adulthood, both by instructing them and also by 






It is over the determination of goals for education, and assessment of the adequacy of the education 
provided, that most conflict arises. Such conflict is avoided when wise policies exist to protect the 
distinctive character of schools, their religious or philosophical orientation and its implications for 
school life. Dutch law protects the richting of a school; every school must meet instructional 
expectations or face intervention by the government inspectorate, but government may not dictate 
its fundamental orientation and how that is expressed in the education provided. Spanish policy 
protects the ideario of the school, French policy its caractère propre. 
 
In countries with pluralistic school systems, these terms are usually applied only to non-public 
schools, with the implicit assumption that public schools are simply neutral and have no business 
promoting character and a distinctive worldview. This has led to interesting debates about whether 
non-public schools have an unfair quality advantage because of their ability to be focused around a 
clear mission (Braster 1996). Indeed, studies in several countries have suggested that this focus 
accounts for the superior academic outcomes of many faith-based schools. After all, “[i]t should not 
be a surprise that schools encouraged to be everything for everybody have found it difficult to be 
exceptionally good at anything” (Hess 2010, 101). 
 
The good school that engages with settled intention to provide both effective instruction and 
character-forming education to the pupils entrusted to it by their parents is thus accountable both to 
society in general and to families though along different dimensions of its mission. Society, through 
government, has every right to require adequate instructional outcomes so as to ensure that every 
child has a fair opportunity in life. It is not society’s right, however, to prescribe the educational 
dimensions of the school’s mission: how it shapes the character and convictions of its pupils. That, 
in a pluralistic democracy, is for parents to determine by their choice of schools. 
 
Public policies supporting structural pluralism in school systems are capable not only of reducing 
significantly the cultural and political conflict so evident today, but also permit schools to be more 
effective in developing character and citizenship by encouraging them to organize school life around 
a coherent and distinctive mission. 
 
Opponents of allowing publicly funded schools to be autonomous and, in some cases, to have a 
religious character, often argue that the effect of such policies will be to further divide society. They 
have been arguing that for nearly two hundred years, only to be proved wrong again and again by 
actual experience. Most other nations with advanced levels of universal schooling provide such 
public support, with no evident harm to their social fabric and with considerably less conflict over 
schooling than occurs in the United States. Surely the time has come for a similar American 
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